ABSTRACT: Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to 'principle-or rule-based' approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We end by suggesting that our proposed position appears quite appealing since it preserves attractive elements from particularism as well as consequentialism.
Introduction
Moral particularism is the view that a non-moral feature, F, or set of non-moral features, F', that is right-making (i.e. serves to make a certain act morally right) in one set of circumstances need not be right-making in a different set of circumstances, since the moral significance any F or F' may carry is irreducibly context-dependent -the number of non-moral features potentially morally relevant in a situation is in fact infinite. Closely aligned with these claims is the particularist's rejection of moral principles or rules: If the moral significance any non-moral feature or set of non-moral features may have is irreducibly contextdependent there seems to be no use and indeed no space for moral principles or rules.
1 Particularism then, is commonly introduced as an alternative to 'principle-1 Two clarifications are in place: First, the kind of principles rejected by particularism are of a substantial kind that assumes indefeasible supervenience functions holding between the nonmoral and the moral, such as 'lying is always wrong' or 'producing the greatest amount of sensory pleasure is always right' (cf. the 'anomalous' supervenience function that Donald Davidson takes to hold between the mental and the physical, see Davidson (1981) . But a particularist need not have any quarrel with formal principles that assumes no such indefeasible supervenience functions and hence lack non-moral substantive content, such as or rule-based' approaches to ethics, such as Kantianism and consequentialism, and often associated with accounts of virtue ethics.
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In this paper we do not intend to criticise particularism, but to discuss whether, as it is frequently assumed, there need be a conflict between particularism and consequentialism, and what the supposed conflict is thought to consist in. We argue that there need be no such conflict. It makes perfect sense to be a particularist and a consequentialist. Contrary to what is perhaps commonly believed, the particularist's aversions to consequentialism stem not from some structural feature or features in consequentialism per se, but rather from certain views about value, traditionally associated with consequentialism.
Before we undertake the discussion of how to coherently conjoin particularism and consequentialism, we will briefly consider another supposed contrast between two proposed polarities of the debate; that between particularists and universalists.
Particularism vs. Universalism
It is often said by proponents as well as antagonists of particularism that particularists are committed to denying R. M. Hare's familiar thesis of universalizability of moral judgements. We believe this is a mistake. Consider Hare: 'Moral judgements are, I claim, universalizable in only one sense, namely that they entail identical judgements about all cases identical in their universal properties.' 3 Two individuals, worlds, or what have you, x and y, are identical in all their universal properties if x and y are identical in all their non-moral properties, excluding purely numerical and indexical properties. Particularists 'act rightly' or 'act so as to produce the greatest amount of intrinsic value' (see our response to objection (ii) in section IV below). Second, it may be the case that the particularist's contention is that there is no space or use for principles in ideal practical reasoning. However, whether we humans with finite and fallible capacities need some fairly easily stated and defeasible principles to get on in everyday moral life is, we think, still left open. (More on this below.) Cf. Little (2000) . 2 The supposed connection between moral particularism and virtue ethics is, we think, not entirely clear. It is sometimes stated with reference to Aristotle's view that we cannot expect to find any precise principles in ethics. Cf. Dancy (1993) , p. 50. However, whether Aristotle was a particularist in the sense of e.g. Dancy is debatable, as is whether Aristotle would embrace anything like a modern conception of virtue ethics. Another thing that deserves to be mentioned here is that at one place, Dancy allows that what he calls 'holism of reasons' need not be incompatible with some version or other of consequentialism. Here Dancy seems to more or less anticipate something fairly close to what we argue for in this paper. Unlike him though, we argue the point by way of focusing primarily on axiological considerations. See Dancy (1993) , p. 232 n15. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this passage. 3 Hare(1981), p. 108. agree with universalists 4 that moral properties depends, or supervenes, on nonmoral properties, and hence they should agree that if x and y are identical in all their universal properties, x and y are alike in moral properties, thereby granting the conceptual validity of Hare's universalizability thesis. So this cannot be what the dispute is or should be about.
Admittedly, it seems likely that even if purely numerical and indexical properties are excluded, two individuals, worlds, or what have you, x and y, will very seldom be identical in all their universal properties. This is of course empirically true but it does nothing to refute the conceptual force of the universalizability thesis, at most it reduces its practical significance in moral reasoning.
5 So maybe this is what the dispute between particularists and universalists is or should be about? Perhaps the particularist's point is that morality is too complex an activity to be conducted by principled reasoning. But it should be stressed that the universalist need not take her universal principle to be a crude generalisation, simple enough to be easily put to use in concrete cases. Consider Hare's outline of what the universalizability thesis is not:
[U]niversalism is not the doctrine that behind every moral judgement there has to lie a principle expressible in a few general terms; the principle, though universal, may be so complex that it defies formulations in words at all. But if it were formulated and specified, all the terms used in its formulation would be universal terms.
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According to this version of universalism the universal principle may be so complex that we humans will never be able to formulate it in words, or gain knowledge about it. This is an epistemological point the particularist and the universalist can jointly agree on. But the particularist might go further and make the metaphysical claim that there as a metaphysical matter of fact are no such principles forthcoming since the number of properties that may affect the moral status of an act is in effect infinite. 7 We take it that it is usually not clear whether particularists are concerned to make merely the epistemological claim mentioned above about universal principles, or whether they (also) want to rest their position on the metaphysical 4 Note that the the universalist, as we picture her, need not be a consequentialist. As Philip Pettit has pointed out: '[universalizability] is so commanding that (…) every account of right action must give it countenance '. Pettit, (1997), p. 141. 5 It is sometimes suggested that this makes the universalizability thesis per se philosophically uninteresting. But we do not agree. As R. M. Hare once remarked, '…it is wrong to take too narrowly utilitarian an attitude towards philosophical theses… '. (1963) , p. 12. Even if empirically unlikely, it is still conceptually possible to encounter (perhaps imaginatively) two distinct x and y identical in all universal properties. In such a case the universalizability thesis per se tells us at least that purely numerical and indexical properties lack moral significance. 6 Hare (1963), p. 39. 7 Cf. Kagan, (1998), pp. 184-6. claim.
8 Be that as it may, particularists and universalists should jointly accept the universalizability thesis per se, i.e. the view that if x and y are identical in all non-moral universal properties, x and y are identical in moral properties. Of course, the practical significance of the universalizability thesis per se is extremely limited, for very seldom will x and y be identical in all non-moral universal properties. But as we have seen, the universalist can agree that the universalizability thesis per se lacks practical significance in moral reasoning.
Whether there is a conflict between particularism and universalism depends on the specific formulations of the respective standpoints. If the particularist bases her position on the metaphysical claim that there are no universal principles forthcoming she stands in a metaphysical disagreement with the universalist (and of course with the particularist that bases her position only on the epistemological claim). If the universalist claims that we can indeed formulate a universal principle in finite non-moral terms and gain knowledge about it as well as make practical use of it she stands in an epistemological disagreement with the particularist (and of course with the universalist who denies this claim) concerning moral reasoning. But if the particularist's claim is only that universal principles lack practical significance since they defy formulations in words, the universalist could very well agree. So there need be no conflict here. At any rate there should be no conflict about the universalizability thesis per se; that thesis should be jointly accepted by both particularists and universalists.
Particularism vs. Consequentialism
Let us now move on to the central issue in this paper: need there be a conflict between particularism and consequentialism? Consequentialism in its broadest version says that that act is right which is conducive to the best consequences, i.e. conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic goodness or intrinsic value.
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Consequentialists thus characteristically think of 'right' in terms of 'value'. 10 Particularists on their part characteristically stress that the ability to correctly judge an act right or wrong in a particular set of circumstances, requires a kind of moral sensitivity to what stands out as the morally significant features of that particular set of circumstances. This stress on a kind of moral sensitivity is one of the reasons why particularism is often associated with accounts of virtue ethics.
We now want to suggest that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from some structural feature or features in consequentialism per se, but rather from substantial and structural views about value traditionally associated with consequentialism. As is well-known, the early consequentialists were hedonists. Substantially, they held that (experiences of) pleasure are the only thing of positive intrinsic value, and that (experiences of) pain are the only thing of negative intrinsic value. Structurally, this is monism about value. Two historically prominent representatives of this view are of course Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill. 11 Later proponents of consequentialism, such as G. E. Moore, 12 rejected hedonism and formulated a pluralist version of consequentialism according to which a variety of things, such as personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments, etc, are all intrinsically valuable. Despite their axiological disagreements, monist and pluralist consequentialists will both say that that act is right which is conducive to the greatest amount of whatever monist or pluralist intrinsic value.
The particularist's complaint against this picture concerns the structure of monism and pluralism about value. According to the particularist, there is no property or number of properties that invariantly, i.e. in each and every set of circumstances, serve as right-making qua valuable. What is valuable in one set of circumstances need not be valuable in another set of circumstances. The particularist can thus be said to reject the very terms of the monist/pluralist debate.
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But the consequentialist need not be either a monist or a pluralist about value. While maintaining the consequentialist framework of her theory, she could be a particularist about value. Particularism about value differs structurally from monism as well as pluralism insofar as it holds that what is valuable in one set of circumstances need not be valuable in a different set. Value, according to this view, is irreducibly context-dependent in a way that cannot be finitely cashed out in non-valuational terms. Adopting a particularistic approach to value, the consequentialist might say that what amounts to the best consequences, i.e. what is tantamount to the greatest amount of intrinsic value -and hence which act is the right one -depends on the circumstances. In one set of circumstances it might 11 As is well-known, Mill's view departed from Bentham's insofar as Mill defended 'qualified hedonism', according to which the value of an experience of pleasure is not determined solely by its intensity, but also by its quality. It is perhaps not quite right to attribute to Mill the view that (experiences of) pleasure is the only thing of positive intrinsic value. An anonymous referee suggested that Mill might have held that pleasure is the only positive thing of intrinsic value, while the absence of pain is another thing of intrinsic value which is in some sense negative. A third possible interpretation is that for Mill, the only thing of positive intrinsic value is happiness, where this is understood as comprising the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. See Mill (1969) . 12 13 McNaughton (1988), p. 194. be valuable to maximise the amount of (experiences of) pleasure, in another it might be valuable not to maximise the amount of (experiences of) pleasure and invoke a painful punishment, in yet another to tell the truth, and so on. Note that what is distinctive about this version of consequentialism is that it says that what is intrinsically valuable in one set of circumstances need not be intrinsically valuable in a different set of circumstances. It does not merely say that what is conducive to intrinsic value (i.e. instrumentally valuable) varies from circumstances to circumstances -the latter is a rather trivial point, universally agreed on by any version of consequentialism. The consequentialist that adopts a particularistic approach to value can thus agree with the particularist's battle-cry that what is a right-making feature, or set of features, in one set of circumstances need not be a right-making feature, or set of features, in another set of circumstances -the whole matter is irreducibly context-dependent.
Note also that this enables the consequentialist to join in on the particularist's picture of the good moral agent, according to which it takes a kind of moral sensitivity to discern which act is right in a particular situation. Since what amounts to the best consequences, i.e. what amounts to the highest amount of intrinsic value, varies according to context, it is not recommendable to use a check-list of values, whether monist or pluralist. On this picture, it does not seem unlikely that it actually takes a kind of moral sensitivity to discern what amounts to the best consequences in various circumstances. This may suggest a hybrid theory of consequentialism and virtue ethics.
14 In any case, we hope to have shown that there need be no conflict between particularism and consequentialism. If there is a conflict it will concern the substantial and structural views about intrinsic value employed by the particularist and the consequentialist respectively. But this is an axiological conflict, it is not due to any structural features of consequentialism per se.
Five Objections
We want to consider five objections to our claim that there need be no conflict between particularism and consequentialism. The common gist in these objections is that our proposed position is in fact not stable since particularism and consequentialism can only be shown to not conflict at the cost of abandoning one essential element of either view. As we will show, however, none of the objections poses a serious threat to our proposed position.
(i) A critic might argue that there is indeed such a conflict since while particularism allows 'everything' (any non-moral feature of a situation) to potentially play a morally significant role, consequentialism narrows down the set of potentially morally significant properties to include only those properties belonging to the consequences of an act. It deserves to be pointed out that when calculating the value of the consequences of a certain act, a, the consequentialist may also take into consideration the possible value of a itself. With this point entered in the record, we take the remarks in (i) to be correct. But this is not to say that (i) necessarily points to a conflict between particularism and consequentialism, for it would seem remarkable to urge that to be a particularist you have to say that every (in the true sense of the word) non-moral feature may carry moral significance. To qualify as a particularist it should be sufficient for one to recognise that the set of non-moral features potentially significant to the moral status of an act does not admit of being finitely cashed out in non-moral terms as a universal principle, and perhaps it does not as a metaphysical matter of fact allow such cashing out (see section II above).
(ii) A second objection is that while particularism characteristically rejects substantial moral principles or rules, other than the entirely formal 'act rightly', consequentialism does indeed recognise one such principle or rule, namely 'act so as to maximise the amount of intrinsic value'. So need not there be a conflict after all?
No. The consequentialist can respond that the principle 'act so as to maximise the amount of intrinsic value' cannot be cashed out in finite non-valuational terms. For again, according to particularism about value there is no universal formula stating what is intrinsically valuable in each and every set of circumstances. What is intrinsically valuable in one set of circumstances need not be intrinsically valuable in a different set. Note that the principle 'act so as to maximise the amount of intrinsic value' is equally formal as the principle 'act rightly'. Granted, the former principle is less inclusive than the latter insofar as it only takes into consideration the value of the consequences of an act, and perhaps the possible value of the act itself (cf. above). But this does not make it less formal or less non-substantive. The consequentialist can maintain that even if the set of non-moral features potentially significant to the moral status of an act is less inclusive or narrower in scope, what amounts to 'the best consequences' (the greatest amount of intrinsic value) is so heavily context-dependent that it does not admit of being finitely cashed out in non-valuational terms as a universal formula, and perhaps it does not as a metaphysical matter of fact allow such cashing out. This is perfectly compatible with particularism.
(iii) An objection related to the one just discussed is the following: A particularist will balk at the consequentialist's practice of deriving normative concepts such as 'right', from axiological concepts such as '(conducive to the greatest amount of) intrinsic value', for she will hold that in some circumstances it is not right to maximise intrinsic value -the axiological and normative concepts may in certain circumstances, as it were, pull in different directions (it might be the case that in a certain set of circumstances, performing a would maximize intrinsic value, while b would be the morally right act to perform), and the latter has always practical precedence over the former. Now, it is indeed an (the?) essential feature of consequentialist reasoning that the normative is accounted for in terms of the axiological. So have we perhaps come across a profound tension between particularism and consequentialism?
There are several things to say in response to this objection. First and foremost, we want to stress the radicalism of the particularist approach to value. Something, F, that possesses a certain intrinsic value, V, in circumstances C need not possess V in a different set of circumstances C'. Second, given the irreducibly context-sensitive character of the axiological concepts, and given that, according to the particularist, the irreducible context-sensitive character applies to the normative concepts as well, it is difficult to see why and on what grounds the particularist would want to claim that e.g. the respective notions of 'right' and 'conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value' might pull in different directions in one and the same set of circumstances.
15 It is hard to see then why and on what grounds the particularist would want to deny that the respective notions of 'right' and 'conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value' are extensionally equivalent.
16 And as mentioned above, the consequentialist need not claim more than that. Or must he? The consequentialist's contention, our objector might continue, is after all that a right act is made right because it is conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value. But this is not troublesome. Particularists and consequentialists jointly recognise and accept the supervenience of non-natural concepts (normative and axiological) upon natural facts. 17 The consequentialist can then perfectly well explain why an act a in a set of circumstances C is right, without referring to moral or evaluative concepts. The non-moral feature, F, or set of non-moral features, F', that make a right in C are just the (set of) non-moral feature(s) that makes a conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value in C. We believe then that given a particularistic approach to value, the particularist will not and should not balk at the consequentialist practice of deriving the normative concepts from the axiological 15 There are reasons to believe that the normative and the axiological might pull in different directions if one endorses a morality with deontological constraints that hold irrespective of consequences, and an axiology according to which certain natural features carry contextindependent indefeasible evaluative relevance. But a true particularism contains no such indefeasible moral rules or axiological regularities. 16 We need not, and do not, deny that it is possible to be a particularist both about normative concepts and axiological concepts, and claim that these concepts might pull apart, i.e. that 'right' and 'conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value' need not be extensionally equivalent. But while we grant that such a position would not be incoherent we do not find it at all recommendable. First, considerations of theoretical economy indicates that allowing the normative and the axiological concepts to pull apart is theoretically extravagant. Second, and more importantly, such a view seems to cut off the intimate tie between intrinsic values and practical relevance, for it says that, in some situations at least, it is not right to respond or to act so as to maximise the amount of intrinsic value. 17 Cf. Danielsson, (1988), p. 77; Carlson (1995), pp. 42f. concepts. Hence we have not yet found a conflict between the two views.
(iv) Fourthly, it might be objected that what we have called a 'particularistic approach to (intrinsic) value' is incoherent since it conflicts with the classic Moorean conception of intrinsic value which among other things says that intrinsic value depends solely on features intrinsic to that which has it, and is therefore context-independent. 18 We grant that there is a conflict between the Moorean conception of intrinsic value and the particularistic approach to intrinsic value. We also grant that the Moorean conception of intrinsic value should be acknowledged to have been greatly influential in the last century's axiological debate. But it is relevant for our purposes to point out that the Moorean conception of intrinsic value can hardly be said to be essentially tied to consequentialism, and what is more, it has not gone unquestioned. We believe that it is not incoherent to hold that the intrinsic value or as it is sometimes called -final value, of a thing may be conditional on the context in which it appears. This would make the particularistic approach to intrinsic value (or final value) perfectly coherent, but we cannot argue for that claim here.
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(v) An advantage, a critic might say, of the classical hedonistic version of consequentialism, and, to some extent, of pluralist versions of consequentialism, is that they are action-guiding in a clear sense, without requiring any special moral sensitivity or the like in the agent. The version of consequentialism proposed in this paper, however, fails grotesquely in this respect, and thus fails to capture an essential and attractive element of consequentialism as ordinarily conceived.
What are we to say about this? Well, first of all, it is not all that obvious that monistic or pluralistic versions of consequentialism are, or are supposed to be, action-guiding in any clear sense. Furthermore, we need to ask ourselves to what extent, and for whom, we really think that a plausible moral theory should function as action-guiding. If we are to apply hedonism, say, we must be aware of the total consequences of our actions, and we also need to know something about how to make interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons and measures of degrees of pleasure (something that has turned out to be a really tricky question). It could be argued that we never know for sure the intrinsic value of an outcome we will bring about through our acting in certain ways, so really, who is able to actually put this theory into practice? The same is of course true for pluralistic versions of consequentialism, but here we also need to understand how to measure the different values against each other. Indeed, it may even be the case that these theories would be indirectly self-defeating were they to be directly applied.
Consequentialists are actually often prone to point out that, due to the above and other considerations, we should not use the consequentialist criteria for right action as a decision procedure in everyday moral life. But in the light of the distinction between those two interpretations of consequentialism -i.e. as providing a criterion of right action and as providing a decision procedure -it seems to us that the premise of the present objection to our proposed version of consequentialism might well be doubted: Is 'action-guidance' really an essential or even wanted element of consequentialism? But perhaps what the objector has in mind is that monistic and pluralistic versions of consequentialism at least ideally offer action-guidance for any agent in any situation. That is, provided that you possess information about all the non-moral facts of a set of actions (including their consequences), you only need to apply the criteria to find out which of the acts would be the right one according to the theories in question. But that is not true of our version of consequentialism. Even if one possesses all the information referred to above, it still takes something more, such as a moral sensitivity or competence, to identify the morally relevant features and to find out which act is conducive to the greatest amount of intrinsic value, i.e. morally right, in the situation at hand. But does a requirement of such a sensitivity or competence appear especially strange or unattractive? After all, why should we believe that an adequate moral theory must be such that it can be applied by just anyone? We will not argue the point here, but it appears somewhat appealing to think that there may be cases where it actually takes a certain sensitivity to apprehend what is morally relevant in a situation. Note that this is not tantamount to saying that most of us are as moral agents more or less always groping about in the dark. On the contrary, it seems fair to say that most of us are as moral agents most of the time to sufficiently high degrees sensitive to the morally relevant features of situations we encounter.
But now we are in real trouble, the critic might go on, because though readily admitting the problems of applying any consequentialist criterion in everyday life, traditional consequentialism can at least offer certain 'rules of thumb' or the like, which might be helpful in achieving the best results. It is a well-known fact that hedonist consequentialists advise us to aim at friendship for its own sake, not because it is intrinsically valuable but because it tends to produce the greatest amount of pleasure. In that sense, being loyal to friends constitutes a useful 'rule of thumb'. But what could our proposed version of consequentialism possibly offer if we grant that we are not always capable of using our sensitivity? Now, there are problems with trying to derive everyday principles for most moral theories of any sort. But to the extent it is at all possible to do so, why would the same possibility not be open to our version of consequentialism? Given the peculiarities of the 'human condition', it might very well be the case that certain features are typically but not indefeasibly morally relevant, such as e.g. the keeping of promises. Though there may be cases where the fact that I have made a certain promise is not relevant to what I ought to do, that does not alter the fact that we learn from experience that the keeping of promises is typically, but not indefeasibly, morally relevant.
Conclusion
To conclude, if there is a conflict between particularism and consequentialism, it is an axiological conflict. But consequentialism per se is not essentially tied to a distinct axiological view. The consequentialist need not be either a monist or a pluralist about value, and neither need she accept the Moorean conception of intrinsic value. The consequentialist could perfectly well be a particularist about value. Hence, given a particular axiological view, there need be no conflict between particularism and consequentialism.
One final reflection is that, as has hopefully emerged from our response to objection (v) in section IV above, the position we have sketched in this paper, i.e. a particularistic approach to a value within a consequentialist framework, appears pretty appealing, insofar as it preserves attractive elements from two quite different directions. From particularism it preserves the picture of morality and valuations as complex and context-sensitive activities, from consequentialism it preserves '…the rather simple thought that it can never be right to prefer a worse state of affairs to a better. ' 20 This should make it a suitable target of further and more careful consideration and elaboration. 21 
